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EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS - DOUBLE DOMICILE - INHERITANCE TAXATION OF INTANGIBLES - Plaintiff was appointed executor by a
Georgia court which found that decedent had been domiciled in Georgia. Defendant was appointed administrator by a New York court which found that
decedent was domiciled in New York. Plaintiff and defendant were interpleaded
in the Delaware court by a Delaware corporation to determine who was entitled to shares of stock owned by decedent in the Delaware coi:poration. Plaintiff claimed that the Delaware court was required to give full faith and credit
to the Georgia finding that decedent was domiciled in Georgia. The Supreme
Court of De1aware found that decedent was domiciled in New York and
ordered delivery of the stock certificates to . the New York administration.1
On certiorari, held, the Delaware judgment was not a denial of full faith and
credit since Delaware was free to decide the question of domicile anew as to the
New York administrator, who was not a party to the Georgia judgment. Riley
v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343, 62 S. Ct. 608 (1942).
It is an accepted rule that proceedings in one state do not bind the whole
world as to the question of domicile.l1 Such proceedings are conclusive only as

New York Trust Co. v. Riley, (Del. 1940) 16 A. (2d) 772.
sThormann v. Frame, 176 U. S. 350, 20 S. Ct. 446 (1900). An in rem
proceeding is not necessarily based on domicile and therefore is not binding on that
question. Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co., 242 U. S. 394, 37 S. Ct. 152 (1917). Under
the Fourteenth Amendment, a state cannot determine the question of domicile as
against a person who was not a party to the proceeding. If determination of domicile
is a fact necessary to the jurisdiction of the court, the judgment is not binding as to
the jurisdiction of the court on one who has not litigated the question before the court.
Hall v. Wilder Mfg. Co., 316 Mo. 812, 293 S. W. 760 (1927). IJJ general as to the
binding effect of a determination of domicile, see 121 A. L. R. 1200 (1939).
1
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to the property within the jurisdiction of the court and as to parties to the proceedings or their privies. 3 In the principal case, the decision that an administrator appointed in a second state is not a party to the original proceedings was
based largely on the grounds that every state has an interest in the administration
of estates of decedents domiciled within the state and that the state cannot be
barred from collecting death taxes on estates of decedents domiciled within the
state by a determination of a court in another state that the decedent was
domiciled there. 4 Although it was formerly held that intangibles could be truced
by the state of domicile of the decedent owner only, 5 the recent rulings hold
that there is no right to be free from conflicting decisions of state courts as to
domicile or from multiple taxation based on such decisions. 6 The principal case
reiterates the Court's attitude on the question .of double domicile.7 Since the
state of Georgia is not a party to the proceedings in the principal case,8 it is not
bound by the judgment and is still free to levy a death tax based on the finding
of the Georgia court that the decedent was domiciled within the state. 'However,
the Georgia executor is bound by the Delaware judgment and cannot contest
the claim of the New York administrator to the intangible assets of the estate.9
Therefore, unless there is other property in Georgia, the· practical result may be
to make the collection of any tax by the state of Georgia very di.fficult.10 In
view of the fact that the decedent may in fact have had his place of abode in
more than one state during the course of a year and that each of those states may
have extended protection or other benefits to the decedent with respect to the
intangibles, each state extending such benefit should have the power to tax.11
On the other hand, taxation by several states on the full amount of the property
3 Thormann v. Frame, 176 U. S. 3 50, 20 S. Ct. 446 {1900); Overby v. Gordon,
177 U. S. 214, 20 S. Ct. 603 (1900).
'
4 See especially Chief Justice Stone's concurring opinion, 315 U. S. 343 at 3 55.
5 Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204, 50 S. Ct. 98 (1930);
First National Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U.S. 312, 52 S. Ct. 174 (1932); Nevin
v. Martin, (D. C. N. J. 1938) 22 F. Supp. 836, affd. 307 U. S. 615, 59 S. Ct.
1046 (1939). For a possible exception to the rule see Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S.
357, 59 S. Ct. 900 (1939); Graves v. Elliott, 307 U. S. 383, 59 S. Ct. 913 (1939).
6 Worcester ~ounty Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U. S. 292, 58 S. Ct. 185 (1937);
Texas v. Florida, 306 U. S. 398, 59 S. Ct. 563, 830 (1939); Nevin v. Martin,
(D. C. N. J. 1938) 22 F. Supp. 836.
7 The Court says, " ..• conflicting decisions on domicile •.. [are] an inevitable
consequence of existing federal system, which endows its citizens with freedom to
choose the state or states within which they desire to carry on business, enjoy their
leisure, or establish their residences." 315 U. S. at 350.
8 Executors and administrators represent the deceased, and although the Court
speaks of them as representing the interests of the state, it is the general interest of a
state in the administration of decedents' estates of which it is speaking and not representation for the purpose of binding the state by the judgment.
9 The domiciliary representative as indicated by the present action has title to
the intangibles. See 21 AM. JuR. 854 (1939).
10 See Colorado v. Harbeck, 232 N. Y. 71, 133 N, E. 357 (1921).
11 Merrill, "Jurisdiction to Tax-Another Word," 44 YALE L. J. 582 (1935);
Farage, "Multiple Domicils and Multiple Inheritance Taxes-A Possible Solution,"
9 GEo. W.AsH. L. REv. 375 (1941).
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appears to be equally unjust.12 However, it seems unlikely that the Court will
change either its view that the state of domicile has jurisdiction for the purpose
of levying death taxes on intangibles or its position, as indicated by the principal
case, that there is no constitutional provision violated when several courts .find
that the decedent was domiciled within their respective jurisdictions.

Rohert Walsh

19 Merrill, "Jurisdiction to Tax-Another Word,"· 44 YALE L. J. 582 (1935).
The writer suggests that the benefit-burden theoiy restricting the right to tax to the
jurisdiction which is in a position to extend protection or benefit to the thing taxed
could be applied to inheritance taxation of jntangibles, and if each state is limited to
taxing only that proportion of the property to which it has extended benefits, the
result seems to he fair both to the states and to the estate. Farage, "Multiple Domicils
:md Multiple Inheritance Taxes-A Possible Solution," 9 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 375
(1941), suggests proportioning the amount of the tax in accordance with the proportion of decedent's tangible property which was within the taxing state, or an equal
division among the claiming states, or a combination of the two. See also Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194, 26 S. Ct. 36 (1905), where the
Court says that a tax on tangible property by a state not in a position to extend benefits
is a violation of due process, and Curiy v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 357, 59 S. Ct. 900
(1939), in which the Court held that each state extending protection to the relationship or interest coming from intangibles may tax them.

